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2057d · Bitcoin Cash
In theory when miner income is mostly fees the block time should become even more consistent, making 90 minute blocks almost non-existent
Donmekus
replied 1545d
Where are you Jake. It's been long on memo
replied 2057d
This is because as time since last block increases, fees in mempool increase. So it becomes more profitable to mine the larger the mempool gets
replied 2057d
By the time 60 or 90 minutes has gone by since the last block, the mempool would be so large with fees that 100% of hashpower should be online trying to get them
replied 2053d
Are you thinking hash power would be diverted from other places (eg BTC) to find a block with many fees?
replied 2053d
No, this is assuming a single chain
replied 2052d
then the hash power would have been in idle reserve?
replied 2052d
Yes. If there were no subsidy and the mempool was empty, there wouldn't be a fee for the miner to get
replied 2051d
thanks for explaining.
replied 2057d
Conversely, after a block is mined the mempool should be empty and without a subsidy it may not be profitable to mine until mempool reaches a certain size.
replied 2057d
So there will be pressure for low hash rate before 10 minutes and high hash rate after 10 minutes, giving a much more consistent 10 minute block time.
x2dm
replied 2056d
This assumes the cost of mining hardware is negligible compared to the electricity cost of mining. I'm not so sure that's a good assumption.
replied 2056d
Even if someone gave you mining hardware for free, without a subsidy and with an empty mempool it wouldn't be profitable for anyone to mine
x2dm
replied 2056d
Yes... My point was: if hardware is expensive and electricity is cheap, you wouldn't want the hardware to sit idle. You'd mine all the time, even when the rewards are low.
replied 2055d
Sunk cost fallacy. Once you have mining hardware all you care about is variable costs. Mining hardware costs only affect whether you buy more hardware.
x2dm
replied 2055d
But is it profitable to buy hardware, knowing that it will only run some of the time, when the mempool gets extra full? Maybe. Depends on both the hardware cost and the variable costs.
replied 2055d
It does seem inefficient for miners to turn on and off so frequently
x2dm
replied 2055d
In any case, I agree it will be more profitable to mine when the mempool is bigger, but the *degree* to which miners will smooth over block-time variability depends on their costs.
replied 2056d
Even fees on BTC aren't high enough to make a considerable difference in profitability, the block reward holds the majority of the value, and mining is still profitable in many areas
replied 2055d
The thread was about when the fees become much larger than the subsidy
replied 2057d
is there any good discussion about why blockchain has no minimum time interval ?
1-minute block intervals should be precluded by design but guessing there is justification ?
replied 2056d
What you are referring to would be a new consensus rule then. Interesting idea, but I'd think at least 5 min before another block would be better. Could be unintended consequences.
replied 2056d
Truth:
This is exquisitely difficult to believe that there is no visible discussion about this.
There must have been some discusion about this
somewhere, somewhen, by someone.
replied 2057d
Shorter block intervals means higher orphan risk, also, you would need to wait more confirms for the same level of certainty.
replied 2057d
What I refer to are all the very fast blocks that occur when hash goes up.
There should be a hard limit mechanism to enforce a 10minute minimum time between blocks.
or Why not ?
replied 2053d
Why not: Disincentivizes competition, could just result in miners shutting off their equipment for ~9m after every new block or easier attack vectors
replied 2057d
That is what the automatic difficulty changes aim to achieve.
replied 2057d
Fails "to achieve".
A simple automated block rejection
based upon timestamps less than 600seconds from the previous block.
Instead we pay for empty blocks in diarrhetic spurts.